Case Id: 7a8d76e8-1412-4032-9dec-4e3e12002f63

Date: 24/07/2015 09:28:05

Targeted stakeholder consultation on the implementation of an EU system for traceability and security features pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of the Tobacco Products Directive 2014/40/EU

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

This is a targeted stakeholder consultation. The purpose of this consultation is to seek comments from stakeholders:

- directly affected by the upcoming implementation of an EU system for traceability and security features pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of the new Tobacco Products Directive (Directive 2014/40/EU), or
- considering to have special expertise in the relevant areas.

In the Commission's assessment, the following stakeholders, including their respective associations, are expected to be directly affected:

- 1. manufacturers of finished tobacco products,
- 2. wholesalers and distributors of finished tobacco products,
- 3. providers of solutions for operating traceability and security features systems,
- 4. governmental and non-governmental organisations active in the area of tobacco control and fight against illicit trade.

Not directly affected are retailers and upstream suppliers of tobacco manufacturers (except the solution providers mentioned in point 3 above).

The basis for the consultation is the Final Report to the European Commission's Consumers, Health and Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA) in response to tender n° EAHC/2013/Health/11 concerning the provision of an analysis and feasibility assessment regarding EU systems for tracking and tracing of tobacco products and for security features (hereafter the Feasibility Study). The Feasibility Study was published on 7 May 2015 and is available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/docs/2015_tpd_tracking_tracing_frep_en.pdf. The interested stakeholders are advised to review the Feasibility Study before responding to this consultation.

The comments received in the course of this consultation will be an input to the further implementation work on a future EU system for traceability and security features. In particular, the comments will be taken into account in a follow-up study.

Stakeholders are invited to submit their comments on this consultation at the following web-address https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/trace until 31 July 2015. The web-based survey consists of closed and open questions. For open questions stakeholders will be asked to provide comments up to the limit of characters indicated in the question or to upload (a) separate document(s) in PDF format up to the limit of total number of standard A4 pages (an average of 400 words per page) indicated in the question. Submissions should be - where possible - in English. For a corporate group one single reply should be prepared. For responses from governmental organisations, which are not representing a national position, it should be explained why the responding body is directly affected by the envisaged measures.

The information received will be treated in accordance with Regulation 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community (please consult the privacy statement). Participants in the consultation are asked not to upload personal data of individuals.

The replies to the consultation will be published on the Commission's website. In this light no confidential information should be provided. If there is a need to provide certain information on a confidential basis, contact should be made with the Commission at the following email address: SANTE-D4-SOHO-and-TOBACCO-CONTROL@ec.europa.eu with a reference in the email title: "Confidential information concerning targeted stakeholder consultation on the implementation of an EU system for traceability and security features". A meaningful non-confidential version of the confidential information should be submitted at the web-address.

Answers that do not comply with the specifications cannot be considered.

A. Respondent details

- *A.1. Stakeholder's main activity:
 - a) Manufacturer of tobacco products destined for consumers (finished tobacco products)
 - b) Operator involved in the supply chain of finished tobacco products (excluding retail)
 - c) Provider of solutions
 - d) Governmental organisation
 - e) NGO
 - f) Other
- *A.1.e. Please specify:
 - i) NGO active in the area of fight against illicit trade of tobacco products
 - O ii) Other

*A.2. Contact details (organisation's name, address, email, telephone number, if applicable name of the ultimate parent company or organisation) - if possible, please do not include personal data Text of 1 to 800 characters will be accepted

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International Tax & Investment Center

1800 K Street, NW

Suite 718

Washington, DC 20006

USA

Mobile: 1-202-486-6585

Phone: 1 202-530-9799

Fax: 1 202-530-7987
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- *A.3. Please indicate if your organisation is registered in the Transparency Register of the European Commission (unless 1d):
 - Yes
 No
- *A.4. Extract from the trade or other relevant registry confirming the activity listed under 1 and where necessary an English translation thereof.

2143936c-7e48-475f-a387-6eaf679cefed/Compliance_with_U_S__Law_and_Regulations__Webster_
• 524934ab-efb7-4aef-bbcb-a531cfb029ec/EXTRACTS FROM THE ITIC WEBSITE —
iticnet.docx

B. Options proposed in the Feasibility Study

B.1. Please rate the appropriateness of each option for tracking and tracing system set out in the Feasibility Study in terms of the criteria listed in the tables below

B.1.1. Option 1: an industry-operated solution, with direct marking on the production lines carried out by tobacco manufacturers (for further details on this option, please consult section 8.2 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	•	0	0	0	0	0
*Interoperability	•	0	0	0	0	0
*Ease of operation for users	•	•	0	©	0	0
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	•	•	0	0	0	0
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	•	0	0	0	0
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	•	•	0	•	0	0
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	•	©	0	©	•	©

B.1.2. Option 2: a third party operated solution, with direct marking on the production lines carried out by a solution or service provider (for further details on this option, please consult section 8.3 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Interoperability	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Ease of operation for users	0	©	0	0	•	0
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	0	©	0	0	•	•
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	©	0	0	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	0	©	0	•	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	0	©	0	0	•	0

B.1.3. Option 3: each Member State decides between Option 1 and 2 as to an entity responsible for direct marking (manufacture or third party) (for further details on this option, please consult section 8.4 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Interoperability	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Ease of operation for users	0	•	0	•	•	0
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	0	©	0	0	•	•
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	•	0	0	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	0	©	0	0	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	0	©	0	©	•	0

B.1.4. Option 4: a unique identifier is integrated into the security feature and affixed in the same production process (for further details on this option, please consult section 8.5 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Interoperability	0	•	0	0	•	0
*Ease of operation for users	0	•	0	•	•	•
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	•	•	•	•	•	•
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	•	0	•	•	•
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	0	•	•	•	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	0	©	0	©	•	0

- B.1.5. Please upload any additional comments on the options referred to in question B.1 (max. 5 pages)
 - e1c89011-7733-419f-9de9-6b34de7e7e3e/EU SURVEY ON TRACK AND TRACE B.docx
 - B.2. Please rate the appropriateness of each option for security features set out in the Feasibility Study in terms of the criteria listed in the tables below

B.2.1. Option 1: a security feature using authentication technologies similar to a modern tax stamp (for further details on this option, please consult section 9.2 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Interoperability	0	•	0	0	•	0
*Ease of operation for users	0			•	0	
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	•			•	•	
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	•	0	0	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	0	•	0	•	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	0	©	0	0	•	0

B.2.2. Option 2: reduced semi-covert elements as compared to Option 1 (for further details on this option, please consult section 9.3 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Interoperability	©	•	0	0	•	0
*Ease of operation for users	0			•	•	•
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	0			•	•	
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	•	0	•	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	0	•	0	©	•	•
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	0	•	0	•	•	0

B.2.3. Option 3: the fingerprinting technology is used for the semi-covert and covert levels of protection (for further details on this option, please consult section 9.4 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Interoperability	0	•	0	0	•	0
*Ease of operation for users	0			•	0	
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	•			•	•	
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	•	0	0	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	0	•	0	•	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	0	©	0	0	•	0

B.2.4. Option 4: security feature is integrated with unique identifier (see Option 4 for traceability) (for further details on this option, please consult section 9.5 of the Feasibility Study)

	Appropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Neutral	Somewhat inappropriate	Inappropriate	No opinion
*Technical feasibility	0	0	0	0	•	0
*Interoperability	0	•	0	0	•	0
*Ease of operation for users	0			•	0	
*System integrity (e.g. low risk of manipulation)	•			•	•	
*Potential of reducing illicit trade	0	•	0	0	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for economic operators	0	•	0	•	•	0
* Administrative/financial burden for public authorities	0	©	0	0	•	0

- B.2.5. Please upload any additional comments on the options referred to in question B.2 (max. 5 pages)
 - d54b87e7-25b6-478e-aebb-36b2345ea242/EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES -2 .docx

C. Cost-benefit analysis

C.1. Do you agree with?

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	No opinion
*The benefit analysis presented in section 11.3.1 of the Feasibility Study	©	©	©	•	•	•
*The cost analysis presented in section 11.3.2 of the Feasibility Study	©	©	©	©	©	•

- *C.1.1. If you selected option "Disagree" or "Somewhat disagree" in the previous question, please upload your main reasons for disagreement (max. 5 pages)
 - c78e9b42-0848-42c5-9d6d-3f87fbda44f3/EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES -C .docx

D. Additional questions

The questions in this section relate to different possible building blocks and modalities of the envisaged system (questions D.1, D.3, D.4, D.6, D.8, D.10, D.12, D.14 and D.16). When replying please take into account the overall appropriateness of individual solutions in terms of the criteria of technical feasibility, interoperability, ease of operation, system integrity, potential of reducing illicit trade, administrative/financial burden for economic stakeholders and administrative/financial burden for public authorities.

authorities.
*D.1. Regarding the generation of a serialized unique identifier (for definition of a unique identifier, see Glossary in the Feasibility Study), which of the following solutions do you consider as appropriate (multiple answers possible)?
a) A single standard provided by a relevant standardization body
b) A public accreditation or similar system based on the minimum technical and
interoperability requirements that allow for the parallel use of several standards;
c) Another solution
d) No opinion
*D.1.a. Please indicate your preferred standardization body
Text of 1 to 400 characters will be accepted
GS1

- D.2. Please upload any additional comments relating to the rules for generation of a serialized unique identifier referred to in question D.1. above (max. 2 pages)
 - 1f4c506e-ede3-43b8-bf2b-0759c1678aaf/EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES -D .docx

 D.3. Regarding (a) data carrier(s) for a serialized unique identifier, which o solutions do you consider as appropriate (multiple answers possible)? a) Solution based on a single data carrier (e.g. 1D or 2D data carriers b) Solution based on the minimum technical requirements that allow multiple data carriers; c) Another solution; d) No opinion 	s)
*D.4. Regarding (a) data carrier(s) for a serialized unique identifier, which o solutions do you consider as appropriate (multiple answers possible)? a) System only operating with machine readable codes; b) System operating both with machine and human readable codes; c) No opinion	of the following
D.5. Please upload any additional comments relating to the options for (a) d serialized unique identifier referred to in questions D.3 and D.4 above (ma • 6152318b-e47f-423f-80bf-97c4790d777e/EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY FEATURES -D5.docx	ax. 2 pages)
*D.6. Regarding the physical placement of a serialized unique identifier, who (multiple answers possible)? □ a) Before a pack/tin/pouch/item is folded/assembled and filled with properties of the properties of	roducts;
*D.6. Regarding the physical placement of a serialized unique identifier, who (multiple answers possible)? a) Before a pack/tin/pouch/item is folded/assembled and filled with processing processing and processing processing and processing pro	ix. 2 pages) TY AND SECURITY nen should it happer roducts;

D.7. Please upload any additional comments relating to the placement of a serialized unique identifier referred to in question D.6. above (max. 2 pages)

D.8. Which entity should be responsible for?

	Economic operator involved in the tobacco trade without specific supervision	Economic operator involved in the tobacco trade supervised by the third party auditor	Economic operator involved in the tobacco trade supervised by the authorities	Independent third party	No opinion
*Generating serialized unique identifiers	•	•	0	0	0
*Marking products with serialized unique identifiers on the production line	•	•	•	•	•
*Verifying if products are properly marked on the production line	•	•	•	•	•
*Scanning products upon dispatch from manufacturer's/importer's warehouse	0	•	0	•	0
*Scanning products upon receipt at distributor's/wholesaler's premises	0	•	0	0	0

*Scanning products upon dispatch from distributor's/wholesaler's premises	©	•	©	©	•
*Aggregation of products	0	•	0	0	0

D.9. In relation to question D.8. above, please specify any other measures that your organisation considers relevant

Text of 1 to 1200 characters will be accepted

It would be beyond the capacity of many authorities to extend their controls to cover the sort of checking envisaged hence the supervision by third party auditor option. However, it should still be part of revenue controls (currently only on manufacturers not on wholesalers) to make unannounced spot checks on all aspects of the process. Revenue authorities do not currently control wholesalers because they do not deal in tax-free products so some other authority (local authority/police/consumer protection authority?) would have to take responsibility for any oversight of this part of the supply chain. This is unlikely to be effective in practice because these authorities have so many other priorities and are also limited in their resources.

is unlikely to be effective in practice because these authorities have
so many other priorities and are also limited in their resources.
*D.10. Regarding the method of putting the security feature on the pack/tin/pouch/item, which of the following solutions do you consider as appropriate (multiple answers possible)? a) A security feature is affixed; b) A security feature is affixed and integrated with the tax stamps or national identification marks; c) A security feature is printed; d) A security feature is put on the pack/tin/puch/item through a different method; e) No opinion
D.11. Please upload any additional comments relating to the method of putting the security feature on the pack referred to in question D.10 above (max. 2 pages)
*D.12. Regarding the independent data storage as envisaged in Article 15(8) of the TPD, which of the following solutions do you consider as appropriate (multiple answers possible)? a) A single centralised storage for all operators; b) An accreditation or similar system for multiple interoperable storages (e.g. organised per manufacturer or territory); c) Another solution d) No opinion
D. 10. Diagon upload any additional comments valating to the independent data staying a referred to

- D.13. Please upload any additional comments relating to the independent data storage referred to in question D.12. above (max. 2 pages)
 - dea289b3-54fe-4b05-b804-3a84c03fecbc/EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES -D12.docx

*D.14. In your opinion which entity(ies) is/are well placed to develop reporting and query tools
(multiple answers possible)?
a) Provider of solutions to collect the data from the manufacturing and distribution chain
b) Provider of data storage services;
c) Another entity
✓ d) No opinion

- D.15. Please upload any additional comments relating to the development of reporting and query tools referred to in question D.14. above (max. 2 pages)
 - f5d7d5a0-7a71-4938-8006-b278f5843ddb/EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES -D15.docx
- *D.16. Do you consider that the overall integrity of a system for tracking and tracing would be improved if individual consumers were empowered to decode and verify a serialized unique identifier with mobile devices (e.g. smartphones)?
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
 - C) No opinion

D.16.a. If yes, please explain your considerations


Text of 1 to 800 characters will be accepted

There are multi-million individual movements/transactions involved with insufficient customs/revenue/other enforcement authorities to make more interventions than those suggested by intelligence and risk analysis information. Enabling individual consumers to contribute to that intelligence and risk information by empowering them to decode and verify the serialized unique identifiers using a mobile device can only add to the overall ability to detect/deter illegal trade.

D.17. Please upload any additional comments on the subject of this consultation (max. 10 pages)

Contact

SANTE-D4-SOHO-and-TOBACCO-CONTROL@ec.europa.eu































EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES - B

QUESTION B1.5 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FROM ITIC

Option B.1.1 The industry operated solution can, I believe, be overseen by an independent third party/government authority. The system generates secret codes and is therefore extremely unlikely if not impossible to be manipulated.

Option B.1.2 This option envisages a monopoly situation using one supplier which is likely to mitigate against flexibility either for manufacturers, those in the wholesale supply chain or for Government authorities. As with all monopolies the costs will not be influenced by competition and can therefore be set at unnecessarily high rates. Because of the scale of such an option across all manufacturing and the onward supply chain throughout all of the EU we have doubts about the feasibility of putting this into operation by 2019 bearing in mind that systems such as EMCS took at least 10 years to come to implementation.

Option B.1.3 This options seems unworkable with the prospect of each Member State opting for a different supplier which would add costs and increase the difficulty of trading across internal EU boundaries.

Option B.1.4 This option involve a paper based security feature. Such features are known to be easier to counterfeit/have stolen and re-used illegally. In a dynamically changing world where technology is advancing rapidly this option looks outdated and less secure.

Attachment B.2.5

EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 15 AND 16 OF TPD 2014/40/EU – 2

Question B.2.5 The development of unique digital identification codes that are generated securely has replaced the paper based and other security features. Paper-based tax stamps require authorities to control not just the excise products but also the tax stamps. Where these products have been counterfeited or stolen and re-used illegally consumers are lulled into a false sense of security.

EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 15 AND 16 OF TPD 2014/40/EU – 3

Question C.1.1 Additional comments on the Cost-Benefit Analysis

Benefits: The benefits assumption does not appear credible. The Track and Trace system (whichever final solution is chosen) will apply only to legitimate manufacturers with onward supply chains and markets within the EU. It cannot apply to counterfeit products nor to illicit whites manufactured outside the EU and smuggled into the EU. Thus, there is no way that adoption of any track and trace system will reduce illicit trade in either counterfeit or illicit whites. Illicit whites are a major and growing part of the illegal market so this seriously undermines the benefits of any track and trace system.

The assumption that the illicit trade in contraband tobacco products will be reduced by 30% is also seriously flawed. First, the EU Track and Trace system will not apply to legitimate products manufactured outside the EU and smuggled into the EU as these will have been subject to whatever Track and Trace system has been adopted in their country of manufacture.

More importantly, interventions and seizures are based nowadays on targeting by intelligence and risk with only a very small proportion of interventions based on random sample. This is the norm in countries with well-developed enforcement systems such as the UK and, we suggest, most of the EU. This method of selection of interventions is the foundation of the UK's success over the last 15 years in tackling the illegal trade in tobacco products. So, we suggest that the only benefits that will arise from a Track and Trace system are likely to be (a) better information on where and when a legal product was diverted from the supply chain which will facilitate large scale enforcement investigations (though these are very small in number in comparison with the number of seizures and the trillions of movements of goods each year) and (b) authorities are more likely to reduce controls on legal producers and divert resources to tackling better disruption of organised criminal gangs and terrorists who currently profit most from the trade.

On page 9 of the ITIC Publication "The Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and How to Tackle it" (second edition 2013) available on the ITIC website at iticnet.org, the author Liz Allen (a former excise division head in HM Revenue and Customs and leader of the UK's Alcohol and Tobacco Fraud Review in 1997/8) compared the KPMG Project Star estimate of illicit cigarette consumption in the EU in 2011 with the seizures published by OLAF for the same period. This indicated an average EU seizure rate of 8% to 10%. Unless the seizure rates across the EU increase exponentially, and we suggest this is unlikely, then there is no way that illicit trade in tobacco products can be reduced by more than a **very small percentage** as a result solely of the implementation of a Track and Trace system.

The benefits assumption will also depend on several other factors:

- 1. Interoperability across the EU and with administrations outside the EU. Unless there is a global technical standard required such interoperability cannot be achieved.
- 2. The resources devoted to interventions need to be sufficient to detect/deter counterfeit markings on products. Otherwise, numbers will be duplicated by the counterfeiters and the duplicates will not be picked up or only very rarely.
- 3. Enforcement authorities have limited resources and many priorities. Unless the general public can be persuaded (and there is little evidence to suggest that this can be achieved easily) to help by reporting suspect packages (after checking using, say, a smart phone) the interventions and seizures will remain comparatively low.

We have not commented on costs but, if the benefits estimate is grossly exaggerated – and we suggest it is – then the costs estimate also warrants careful scrutiny by those who understand the way in which the tobacco products industry currently works both at production and through the supply chain and the authorities who currently control not only the tobacco manufacturers, importers and exporters but the wholesalers of tobacco products.

Attachment D.2

EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 15 AND 16 OF TPD 2014/40/EU – D

Question D.2: The GS1 standard is believed to be the most widely available/used standard in the world that is used for this sort of serialization. Therefore some operators will already be familiar with it. The GS1 standard is believed to have been the most widely tested of the standards available.

EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 15 AND 16 OF TPD 2014/40/EU – D5

Question D.5: The advantage of having codes that are both machine and human readable is that anyone would be able to read the code and report any duplicates/anything suspicious. Otherwise, it would only be possible for those issued with the appropriate machine to do this. This would prevent the general public from assisting enforcement authorities by reporting duplicates.

EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 15 AND 16 OF TPD 2014/40/EU – D12

Question D.12: We envisage that an accreditation system could work based on a global (not just EU) international technical standard. A central hub (similar to the way in which EMCS/other EU systems work) plus national linked databases has been proved to work effectively.

EU SURVEY ON TRACEABILITY AND SECURITY FEATURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 15 AND 16 OF TPD 2014/40/EU – D15

Question D.15: As enforcement and revenue/customs authorities will be the key users of the tools the best way forward would be for a technical sub-group of representatives from the appropriate enforcement authorities of each Member State to form a Technical Working Group (as for EMCS development) to design the way forward for reporting and query tools.