Consultation paper

Stakeholder consultation on health security in the European Union

- The European Commission is developing an initiative on health security in the European Union to protect citizens' health more effectively against serious cross-border threats. Such threats arise from public health events affecting more than one Member State. In most cases, cross-border events occur within the EU but they can also originate outside the EU and affect one or more Member States.
- This initiative was requested by the EU Council, in the conclusions it adopted on 13 September 2010 on Lessons learned from the A/H1N1 pandemic - Health security in the European Union. The principles for the initiative were set out in the Commission Staff Working Document of 18 November 2010 on lessons learnt from the H1N1 influenza pandemic and on health security in the European Union (http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/docs/commission_staff_lesso_nsh1n1_en.pdf).
- The initiative is included in the Commission's Work Programme for 2011.
- The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union gives the EU the competence to carry out action to support, coordinate or supplement the action of Member States in the area of protection and improvement of human health. The EU has been empowered among other things to engage in "monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health".
- Prevention and control of threats from infectious diseases at EU level are already addressed under the legislation adopted in 1998, which provides a basis for epidemiological surveillance and coordination of the response. This system has proved its worth for more than a decade now (e.g. in response to the outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SARS and the H1N1 influenza pandemic).
- However, no such legislation exists on health threats from chemical agents, biological agents other than infectious diseases, radiological and nuclear agents, and environmental events. The aim of this initiative is, therefore, to ensure that all types of public health threats are addressed in a way similar to infectious diseases.
- New developments also need to be taken into account, such as adoption of the International Health Regulations IHR (2005), establishment of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC www.ecdc.europa.eu) and the new provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
- This initiative includes preparedness planning in Member States, public health risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. The Commission coordinates health security measures in the EU through its Health Security Committee (HSC). This is an informal cooperation and coordination body concentrating on health-related threats from terrorism or any deliberate release of biological or other agents, as well as raising levels of preparedness for crossborder threats, in particular an influenza pandemic. The initiative will also put on a work **HSC** formal footing the done within the more (http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness response/hsc/index en.htm).

Aim of the consultation

The aim is to consult stakeholders on action the European Commission should take to protect EU citizens more effectively against serious cross-border health threats, given the competence conferred by the Treaties.

The Commission is therefore seeking the views of stakeholders on how health security can be strengthened at EU level, taking into account the public health consequences of serious cross-border threats.

The consultation is undertaken by means of an online questionnaire, which is divided into sections covering preparedness (including laboratory capacity, personal data for contact tracing purposes), assessment, management (including the Health Security Committee) and communication.

Please note that the time allowed for replying to the questionnaire is limited to 90 minutes. We therefore recommend that you first consult a PDF version on the website of the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO): http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/consultations/preparedness_cons_02_en.htm.

A glossary is at disposal for clarification of certain words used in the questionnaire.

National, regional and local authorities, health institutions, NGOs, enterprises, interest groups and individual stakeholders are invited to reply to the questionnaire.

Consultation questionnaire

Personal details In what capacity are you replying? as an individual on behalf of an organisation/company on behalf of a national, regional or local authority Last name First name E-mail Organisation (optional) Register* identification number (optional) *Register of Interest Representatives. Through this voluntary register, in the context of the European Transparency Initiative, the European Commission wishes to let citizens know what general or specific interests are influencing the EU decision-making process. For more information, see: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do.

Your function in the organisation (optional)

A. General questions

Prevention and control of threats from infectious diseases are already addressed at EU level. Mechanisms and structures for monitoring, early warning of and combating public health consequences of these serious cross-border threats are already in place to protect the health of EU citizens. However, after the adoption of EU legislation creating these mechanisms, there is a need to take a number of new developments, such as the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) or the establishment of the European Centre for Disease Prevention (ECDC). There is also a need to improve coordination of the structures in place.

Furthermore, other threats to public health arising from deliberate or accidental chemical, radio nuclear, radiological and environmental events are not sufficiently addressed at EU level from a public health perspective. This complicates cross-border cooperation and leads to inefficient, possibly incompatible and even contradictory approaches between Member States as regards the health protection of EU citizens. It needs to be ensured that the public health consequences of these other threats are addressed in a co-ordinated manner.

1.	Do you consider that the EU should take a infectious diseases such as chemical, radio events in its health security policy?			
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
2.	Do you consider that the handling of infection appropriate in view of recent events and dever H1N1 influenza pandemic, implementation of	elopments	in this a	
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
3.	If you answered yes, in which of the following	areas?		
	Preparedness	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Risk assessment	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Risk management	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Risk communication	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
4.	If you answered no, please explain			
	maximum 100 words			
5.	Do you consider that the national capacity for serious cross-border threats arising from nuclear and environmental events should support, coordinate or supplement the action	chemical, be streng	biologic thened b	cal, radiological, by EU action to
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion

6.	In you answered yes, in which of the following	ig areas?		
	Preparedness	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Risk assessment	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Risk management	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Risk communication	ges	no	no opinion
7.	How should the coordination of public heal border health threats be handled at EU I diseases?			
	Less stringently			
	In a similar way			
	More stringently			
	No opinion			
8.	Do you have any additional comment or sug	gestion?		
	100 words			

B. Preparedness planning

Preparedness planning is about developing and strengthening capacities to respond rapidly to any kind of emergency affecting or likely to affect public health.

For infectious diseases the ECDC provides scientific and technical expertise in the development, regular review and updating of preparedness plans. There is, however, no robust EU mechanism to ensure that Member States develop a coherent approach to preparedness planning.

For chemical, radiological, nuclear, environmental or biological threats arrangements are in place to monitor, assess and coordinate the management of these threats, but public health aspects are not sufficiently covered.

The International Health Regulations (2005) require EU Member States individually to build core capacities for surveillance and response to all public health emergencies of international concern. Building on this, a common approach to preparedness planning for all serious cross-border health threats in the EU could be developed.

9.	Do you see the need for the EU to encouplanning?	rage bette	er nation	al preparedness
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
10.	Should this preparedness planning address public health (i.e. including chemical, bic threats)?	•		
	,	ges	no	☐no opinion
11.	Is there a need for coordination of national proby providing a framework to improve interopplans?	•	•	
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
12.	Is there a need for EU preparedness plans threats other than an influenza pandemic?	to deal v	vith serio	us cross-border
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
13.	Is there a need to set up a minimum core cap	acity stand	dard on:	
	Preparedness planning?	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Business continuity planning?	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Critical infrastructures contingency planning?	yes	☐ no	no opinion

14.	at EU level to allow efficient coordination for whether natural, accidental or intentional?	•		•
	Infectious diseases and diseases caused by biological agents (e.g. toxins)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Chemical agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Radiological and nuclear agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Environmental events	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	If you answered no to one or more points, w improved/changed?	hat should	be	
15.	Do you consider that public health consequence border health threats of a chemical, biologenvironmental nature are sufficiently taken in level (e.g. transport, telecommunications, energy).	gical, radi nto accou	ological	and nuclear, or
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
16.	Does the business continuity plan/critical infr company/organisation consider the public cross-border health threats?	health co	onsequer	nces of serious
		∐ yes	∐ no	no opinion
	ernational Health Regulations - IHR (2005)			
•	estions 17 to 19 only addressed to national	. •		•
Mer prov envi safe	International Health Regulations - IHR (20 nber States, may require national legislation risions, covering measures also in sectors ronment, transport, customs, food safety, a sty, chemical safety, security, protection of gerous goods).	to be ado s other t griculture,	pted to c han pub animal l	omply with their lic health (e.g. health, radiation
17.	* How and when do you intend to transpose into your national law?	or have tra	ansposed	d the IHR (2005)
	maximum 100 words			
18.	* Will the transposition of IHR (2005) cover se	ectors othe	er than pu	ublic health? ☐no opinion
* Qu	estion only addressed to national, regional and local au	thorities.		

Health Security Consultation paper_01-03-2011_final

If you answered yes, which sectors?

19.	* The Treaty gives power to the EU to coordi of cross-border relevance, in a manner very IHR (2005). Do you agree that the EU provisions as the IHR (2005)?	close to w	hat is pro	ovided for by the
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	If you answered no, what do you propose?			
	100 words			
Lab	oratory capacity			
Labo labo	oratory networks at EU level ensure the ratory services to analyse specific agents or property coordinated laboratory response to public hea	oathogens	in order	-
resu	n technical support built on laboratory capacilts is an integral part of the surveillance and paredness planning.	•		_
capa	ough the infrastructure for these laboratorie acities and capabilities are not always sufficientures could be organised to serve best the ne	nt. The q	uestion is	•
20.	Would it be useful to have a network at Laboratories to ensure sufficient decentrate following?			
	Highly dangerous pathogens (e.g. viruses, bacteria)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Biological agents other than infectious diseases (e.g. toxins)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Chemical agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Radiological and nuclear agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
21.	Do you consider that the EU should provide s	support to	these net	works?

22. If you answered yes, which of the following support measures should provided?				
	Establishing a coordination structure (funding)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Organising transport of samples to ensure sample sharing	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
	Quality assurance of the laboratory	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Regular meetings with specific reference laboratories in the Member States	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
	Other measures (20 words)			
23.	Would it be useful to have formal EU refere the following?	ence labora	atories (s	ee glossary) for
	Highly dangerous pathogens (e.g. viruses, bacteria)	☐ yes	_ no	☐no opinion
	Biological agents other than infectious diseases (e.g. toxins)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Chemical agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Radiological and nuclear agents	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
	ection, storage and disclosure of persoiing to protect the health of citizens in parti			
may need med	pidemiology, contact tracing is the identifical have come into contact with an infected persoded to trace a contaminated person for the ical diagnosis and the provision of care or treatematically collected or stored for a sufficient time.	on. Specifi purposes atment. Ho	c person of preve	al data are often entive medicine,
cont	problem is that the lack of collection and sact tracing purposes could endanger the purposes cularly where non-national carriers are concerns.	oublic hea		
24.	Would you be in favour of your personal data and shared with public health authorities in danger of being infected or contaminated?	_		•
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion

C. Scientific evaluation and assessment of risks from serious cross-border health threats

When preparing their policy and activities relating to public health, decision makers rely on independent expertise with sound scientific advice on emerging risks to public health. This process includes detecting and monitoring threats, alerting on emerging threats, evaluating potential risks to public health coming from those threats, and notifying such risks to concerned entities.

As regards infectious diseases, the creation of the ECDC and its co-existence with the EU network for the surveillance and control of Communicable diseases created by Decision 2119/98/EC has led to some overlaps in risk assessment in particular the epidemiological surveillance structures in place (e.g. dedicated surveillance networks). This duplication creates an administrative burden and is contrary to the basic principles of lawmaking (clarity, simplicity, etc.).

As regards other serious cross-border threats, risk assessment is addressed by different structures at EU level, e.g. in the area of civil protection, law enforcement and environmental protection. However, the public health aspects and consequences are not sufficiently evaluated and addressed.

25.	Do you see the need for better evaluation or all serious cross-border threats?	f public he	alth issue	es resulting from
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
26.	Do you think that sectors other than the heal of risk assessment sufficiently into consisterious cross-border health threats?		•	•
	Biological agents other than infectious diseases (e.g. toxins)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Chemical agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Radiological and nuclear agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Environmental events	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	If you answered no to one or more points, w improved/changed?	hat should	l be	
27.	Do you think that existing structures for following types are sufficient at EU level?	risk asses	sment o	f threats of the
	Infectious diseases	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Biological agents other than infectious diseases (e.g. toxins)	☐ yes	no	no opinion
	Chemical agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Radiological and nuclear agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Environmental events	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion

28.	from the public health perspective for threats			
	Biological agents other than infectious diseases (e.g. toxins)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Chemical agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Radiological and nuclear agents	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Environmental events	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
29.	If you answered yes, how should such EU ca	pacity be	created?	
	Link up national assessment bodies at EU level	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Set up EU networks of national experts	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Link existing EU assessment bodies	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Extend the current mandate of existing EU agencies	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
30.	Do you think that a single alert tool for all h more efficient?	ealth threa	ats at EU	J level would be
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
31.	Do you think that the existing detection a aspects at EU and national level should be sectors in order to link the different disciplines	e better in	terconne	cted across the
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
(Que	estion 32 only addressed to national, region	nal and lo	cal auth	orities)
32.	* Do you consider that the current Internated decision instrument for notifying public he concern to the WHO (see IHR 2005 Annex level serious cross-border threats?	ealth emei	gencies	of international
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion

Question only addressed to national, regional and local authorities.

<u>D. Management of public health consequences of serious cross-border health</u> threats

The response to a health-related crisis includes a set of decisions and measures taken by the authorities concerned during and after the event, including immediate relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. In principle, this range of measures to manage public health risks is provided in a comprehensive and coordinated way and deals with the whole spectrum of emergency needs including prevention, response and recovery.

For infectious diseases, a formal channel for coordination of public health measures exists: the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) Network Committee. The relationship of this structure with the EU Health Security Committee in the field of infectious diseases needs to be clarified. For example, during the H1N1 influenza pandemic, it was necessary to combine the Health Security Committee with the EWRS Network Committee to ensure that all aspects of managing the pandemic could be discussed in a coherent way.

For all other serious cross-border health threats, the coordination of risk management from a public health perspective is not sufficiently addressed at EU level. So far, these other threats have been dealt with in the context of the EU Health Security Committee, an informal body created through Council conclusions which does not have any decision-making powers. This creates an unbalanced situation in comparison with the approach to infectious diseases.

33.	Do you see the need for better coordination cross-border health threats?	n and ma	ınagemei	nt of all serious
		☐ yes	no	no opinion
34.	Do you consider that real events in the past were efficiently managed at:	with pub	olic health	n consequences
	Regional level?	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	National level?	ges	☐ no	no opinion
	EU level?	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
35.	Do you see the need for improved coord measures (prevention, diagnosis, treatment, the event of a cross-border health threat?	control) a	mong M	ember States in
		∐ yes	∐ no	no opinion
36.	Do you think that a coherent risk managem border public health threats at EU level would	bring add	ed value	?
		∐ yes	∐ no	∐no opinion

37.	Would you be in favour of making the compulsory in order to prevent the propaga threats?			
	Quarantine	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Isolation	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Travel restrictions	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Closing borders	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Medical examination (at point of entry)	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Compulsory vaccination status	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
(Que	estions 38 to 39 only addressed to national	l, regional	and loca	al authorities)
38.	* Do you find useful the following types of level for serious cross-border threats other th			
	Public health risk assessment provided by the ECDC and EU agencies	☐ yes	no	no opinion
	Public health risk management under the auspices of the Health Security Committee	☐ yes	_ no	no opinion
	Public health risk communication under the auspices of the Health Security Committee	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
39.	* When several sectors are involved, does the crisis management during a serious cross-book	,		
	Biological agents?	☐ yes	☐ no	
	Chemical agents?	☐ yes	☐ no	
	Radiological and nuclear agents?	☐ yes	☐ no	
	Environmental events?	☐ yes	☐ no	
	If you answered no to one or more points, w	ho will take	e the lead	d?

^{*} Question only addressed to national, regional and local authorities.

* Health Security Committee

(Questions 40 to 42 only addressed to national, regional and local authorities)

The EU Health Security Committee, chaired by the European Commission, brings together all EU Member States to address health security issues.

40.	* Do you think that the Health Security Committee, as the platform for coordinating at EU level the response to public health consequences of serious cross-border health threats, brings added value?
	☐ yes ☐ no ☐no opinion
41.	* If you answered yes, do you think it would be better to legally formalise the status of the Health Security Committee?
	☐ yes ☐ no ☐no opinion
42.	* If you answered no, what would you see as a coordinating entity at EU level?

E. Communication

Effective public communication is a crucial component of emergency/crisis response. Timely, accurate information can help people at risk take appropriate protective measures, prevent illness and injury, reduce unnecessary care seeking, and facilitate relief and recovery efforts.

An informal channel for risk and crisis communication is in place under the EU Health Security Committee; however, a more robust setting for strengthening the coordination of such communication channels among Member States is needed to share communication strategies, key messages and guidelines.

43.	following serious cross-border health threat	•	n consec	quences of the
□ V	ctious diseases and diseases caused by biol Vell informed	logical agent ☐ Not at al	, •	
□ V	Vell informed	☐ Not at al	l informed	I ☐no opinion
□ V	Vell informed	☐ Not at al	I informed	I ☐no opinion
□ V	Vell informed	☐ Not at al	l informed	I ☐no opinion
44.	Do you see the need to better coordin between Member States at EU level?	ate informa	tion and	communication
		☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
45.	If you answered yes, how?			
	Make risk and crisis communication an integral part of risk management at EU level	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
	Provide more guidelines on risk and crisis communication at EU level	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Support the communication efforts of Member States and other bodies dealing with health measures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
	Establish networks and improve communication with healthcare professionals	☐ yes	☐ no	☐no opinion
	Improve communication with the media, including messages to the general public	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion
	Improve consistency of communication messages between Member States	☐ yes	no	no opinion

46.	What should be done at EU level to improve public confidence in the information provided?				
	maximum 50 words				
(Qu	estion 47 only addressed to national, region			-	
47.	When several sectors are involved, does the Ministry of Health take the lead r communication with the public on public health consequences regarding:				
	Infectious diseases and diseases caused by biological agents (e.g. toxins)?	☐ yes	☐ no		
	Chemical agents?	☐ yes	☐ no		
	Radiological and nuclear agents?	☐ yes	☐ no		
	Environmental events?	\square yes	☐ no		
	If you answered no, who will take the lead?				
48.	When several sectors are involved in a cross-border health threat, would it brin added value to have coordination at EU level for communication with the publi and healthcare professionals on public health consequences regarding:			n with the public	
	Infectious diseases and diseases caused by biological agents (e.g. toxins)?	☐ yes	no	no opinion	
	Chemical agents?	\square yes	☐ no	no opinion	
	Radiological and nuclear agents?	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion	
	Environmental events?	☐ yes	☐ no	no opinion	
The	ula va v fau talaina tha tima ta anavva thia av	4: :			
Thank you for taking the time to answer this questionnaire.					

^{*} Question only addressed to national, regional and local authorities.

Consultation paper

Stakeholder consultation on health security in the European Union

Glossary

Business Continuity Planning (BCP)	BCP refers to the management processes and integrated plans that maintain the continuity of an organisation's critical processes - those processes which enable a business to deliver key services or products - in the case of a disruptive event. Business continuity encompasses all aspects of an organisation that play a role in sustaining critical processes, namely: people, premises, suppliers, technologies, data, etc.
Contact tracing	Identification and diagnosis of persons who have been exposed to a source of contagious agents, and who are potentially in danger of developing or have developed a disease with serious public health consequences.
Crisis management	Management of any critical situation that causes a disruption to the balance between the demand for and supply of medical services. Crisis management involves the plans, structures and arrangements established to bring together the normal endeavours of government, voluntary and private agencies in a comprehensive and coordinated way to deal with the whole spectrum of emergency needs including prevention, response and recovery.
Crisis communication	Communicating in a situation that somehow challenges the public's sense of appropriateness, traditional values, safety, health, security or the integrity of the government.
Crisis preparedness plan	A written document or map for public health crisis management published by the responsible authority. The organisation, responsibilities and measures are defined - with details on how, when and whom - both before and after an event with public health consequences occurs. It aims to provide a policy for preparedness and response to both internal and external disaster situations that may affect the population and the community.
	Preparedness is the knowledge and capacities developed by government, organisations and communities to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of a likely, imminent or current crisis.
Critical infrastructures	Critical infrastructures are those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in EU countries.
Cross-sectoral	Interdisciplinary, collaborative activity that is carried on with the help

action	and/or involvement of several sectors at the same time.
EU	European Union
Health measure ^{*1}	Procedures applied to prevent the spread of disease or contamination; a health measure does not include law enforcement or security measures.
Health security	Activities required, both proactive and reactive, to minimise vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the collective health of populations living across geographical regions and international boundaries.
IHR (2005)	International Health Regulations - IHR (2005): the WHO international regime providing global rules to enhance national, regional and global public health security. This legally-binding agreement significantly contributes to global public health security by providing a new framework for coordinating the management of events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, and improves the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify and respond to public health threats (www.who.int/ihr/en/).
IHR (2005) Annex 2	The annex 2 of the IHR (2005) is a decision instrument for the assessment and notification of events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. It is available under: http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410 eng.pdf.
Interoperability	Property referring to the ability of diverse sectors, disciplines or organisations to work together.
Isolation* ¹	Separation of ill or contaminated persons or affected baggage, containers, conveyances, goods or postal parcels from others in such a manner as to prevent the spread of infection or contamination.
Minimum standard	A level of quality that all health plans and providers are required to meet in order to offer services to clients/customers.
Point of entry*1	A passage for international entry or exit of travellers, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal parcels as well as agencies and areas providing services to them on entry or exit.
Quarantine ^{†1}	Restriction of activities and/or separation from others of suspect persons who are not ill or of suspect baggage, containers, conveyances or goods in such a manner as to prevent the possible spread of infection or contamination.
Real events in the past	Some examples: Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), milk contaminated with melamine, food contaminated with dioxin, Alexander Litvinenko poisoned with polonium-210, stainless steel contaminated with cobalt-60.

WHO definition according to the International Health Regulations (2005). WHO definition according to the International Health Regulations (2005).

Reference laboratory (RL) 1. National Reference Laboratories (NRL)	Nationally-funded institutes/organisations designated by the competent authorities to offer technical and scientific support in specific fields. Their designation and the organisation of their missions may vary from one country to another in the EU (certain countries have permanently designated one or more NRLs, other competent authorities have chosen to select NRLs from their currently operating 'contractors'). As a common denominator their role and tasks include: (1) being directly involved in research programmes and (2) providing technical support to public bodies as regards the implementation of national and EU legislation by: o implementing a quality system in the laboratory; improving measurement systems (instruments, laboratories, networks); ensuring the traceability of the measurements at national level, by providing reference materials to networks or certifying them, organising proficiency testing schemes, etc.; participating in EU quality assurance/quality control programmes; exchanging information by holding training sessions, workshops and conferences.
2. EU- Reference Laboratories (EU-RLs)	EU-RLs guarantee that analytical methods are performed in the state of the art and that the quality of the results is answering to standards agreed at EU level. Therefore, particular responsibilities of the EU-RLs are to train National Reference Laboratories staff on analytical reference methods, and to organise proficiency testing (quality assurance).
	EU Reference Laboratories with scientific and technical expertise in the areas of animal health, public health and zootechnics designated in different EU Decisions, Directives and Regulations. Within the framework of Council Decision No 90/424/EEC of 26 June 1990 on expenditure in the veterinary field, these laboratories may receive EU financial aid for fulfilling tasks and functions specified in legislation.
Response	Sum of public health decisions and measures taken during and after a disaster, including immediate relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Risk assessment	A scientifically based process consisting of the following steps: (i) threat detection and identification, (ii) threat characterisation, (iii) exposure assessment, and (iv) risk characterisation.
Risk communication	The exchange and dissemination of appropriate information about risks to enable decision makers, stakeholders and the public to make appropriate decisions.
Risk management	A process, distinct from risk assessment, of weighing policy alternatives, in consultation with interested parties, considering risk assessment and other factors relevant for health protection of consumers, and if needed selecting appropriate prevention and control options.

Serious cross-	An event of biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear or		
border public	environmental origin with potentially severe consequences for		
health threat	public health which affects or could affect more than one Member		
	State in such a way that the morbidity or mortality in humans is		
	acute and rapidly growing in scale or is unusual for the given place		
	and/or time.		