

Commission

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Report on Competition enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector



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Competition



Overview

- EU competition law elements and actors
- Origin and focus of the Report
- Particularities of competition in the pharmaceutical sector
- Promoting access to affordable medicines
- Driving innovation and increasing the choice of medicines
- Summary facts and figures
- Conclusions



EU competition law – elements and actors (i)

- Anticompetitive agreements (Article 101 TFEU)
 - Parallel competences the Commission and the NCAs
- Abuse of dominant position (Article 102 TFEU)
 - Parallel competences the Commission and the NCAs

Merger control

- Commission's exclusive competence to assess concentrations with "European dimension"
- Commission enforces **State aid** rules in the internal market



EU competition law – elements and actors (ii)

• ECN: the Commission and the NCAs

- Cooperation: exchange of information, coordination of and assistance in investigations & policy
- NCAs inform the Commission about their envisaged decisions -> coherent application of EU competition rules
- Enforcement: leads/complaints/*ex officio*, inspections, sector inquiries, decisions with fines, rights of defence, etc.
- Pharma & health are a specific focus:
 - Specific units in DG COMP dedicated to antitrust and mergers
 - Dedicated ECN subgroup





Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament

Competition Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Sector (2009-2017)

European competition authorities working together for affordable and innovative medicines



Origin: *Council conclusions* on strengthening the balance in the pharmaceutical systems (June 2016); European Parliament resolution on EU options for improving access to *medicines* (March 2017)

• Report is only one of the initiatives

Focus: pharmaceuticals for human use

- Enforcement by ECN COM and national authorities (NCAs)
- ✓ Antitrust (COM + NCAs)
- ✓ Mergers (COM)
- ✓ Market surveys & advocacy (COM + NCAs)


Available in all languages:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceutic als/report2019/index.html

Competition




Particularities of competition in the pharmaceutical sector (i) Demand structure





Particularities of competition in the pharmaceutical sector (ii) Life cycle of medicines

patent + SPC protection




Evolving nature of competition:

- Developing new medicines
 – competition on innovation
- Market
 exclusivity for
 new medicines
 is limited in
 time
- Loss of protection and generic competition



Real life example: impact of generic citalopram entry in the UK (from Lundbeck decision)




Red line: Lundbeck

Blue line: generic citalopram prices (per DDD weighted average, in GBP).

Generic price from Sept. 2003 to Nov. 2004 in UK: **90% price decline**



Impact of pay-for-delay deals on healthcare systems





Contributing to <u>affordable</u> medicines (ii) – antitrust

- 2. Enforcement against **dominant firms** charging **unfairly high prices** (excessive pricing)
 - IT (Aspen), UK (Pfizer/Flynn), DK (CD Pharma)
 - Pending Commission's investigation in Aspen



- **3. Other practices** capable of inflating prices
 - **Coordination between competitors**: market sharing by pharmacists (ES), bidrigging in hospital tenders (HU, SI), exchange of sensitive information, coordination of trading conditions (DK, DE, IT), etc.
 - **Excluding rivals**: offering loyalty discounts to doctors & pharmacies (CY), restricting rivals' access to a key input for production (IT), restricting parallel trade (RO), etc.



Contributing to <u>affordable</u> medicines (iii) – mergers

Ensuring that changes in the market structure do not lead to higher prices

- Preventing acquisitions of close competitors:
 - GEN-GEN (e.g. *Teva/Allergan*)
 - ORI-GEN (e.g. Sanofi/Zentiva)
 - ORI-ORI (e.g. *GSK/Novartis* human vaccines)
- Preserving price pressure from biosimilars (e.g. *Pfizer/Hospira*)
- Concerns addressed through divestments




Contributing to <u>innovation</u> and <u>choice (i)</u> – antitrust

- Actions against practices preventing innovation or limiting choice
 - Incentivizing innovation by enforcing the end of the market exclusivity e.g.
 EU (Servier)
 - Protecting biosimilar against exclusionary rebate scheme PT (*Roche Farmacêutica*)
 - Protecting off-label use of an oncologic product IT (*Avastin/Lucentis*)
- Competition rules support procompetitive co-operation on innovation
 - o e.g. EU Block Exemption Regulation on R&D agreements



Merger threatening to eliminate competing R&D programmes





Report: summary facts and figures (i)

Antitrust

29 decisions by 13 NCAs and the Commission:

- 24 prohibition decisions
 + 5 commitment decisions
- ✓ substantial investigative work in more than 100 other cases
- ✓ over 20 currently pending cases

Mergers

More than 80 merger control proceedings by the Commission:


- 19 problematic mergers with remedies
- intervention rate: 22% (vs. 6% overall)

More than 100 market **monitoring & advocacy** actions by 17 NCAs and the Commission



Summary facts and figures (ii)

Fines totaling over **EUR 1 billion** imposed in 21 cases





Conclusions

Enforcement of the competition law:

- Within its remit contributes to access to affordable and innovative medicines and treatments
- Complementary to legislative and regulatory action
- Remains a matter of high priority for competition authorities:
 - European Commission
 - Pending investigation in *Teva/Cephalon* (pay for delay)
 - Pending investigation in Aspen (unfair pricing)
 - More than 20 pending NCA cases



Contacts

European Commission:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/overview_en.html

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/contacts/electronic_documents_en.html

European Competition Network:



http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/competition_authorities.html